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Strategic Insights: Challenges in Using Scenario Planning for Defense Strategy
January 30, 2018 | Dr. Michael Fitzsimmons
Lawrence Freedman and Colin Gray are two of the most famous contemporary scholars of
military strategy. Within the past few years, each published a book addressing different aspects of
the same practical problem of strategy: defense planning.1 Considered to be strategy’s mundane
cousin, defense planning revolves around how a nation designs its military according to its views
of the future. Freedman’s and Gray’s verdicts on the subject are very similar and simply put: we
are usually wrong when we predict the future of war. This judgment is not new; indeed, it conforms
with the observations of countless defense policymakers and analysts on the challenges of strategic
planning in national security.2
However, those looking to the works of these preeminent strategists for practical prescriptions
on confronting uncertainty in planning are liable to be underwhelmed. Freedman warns against
expecting either too much or too little continuity in current security trends, ultimately concluding
that many predictions about the future of war “deserve to be taken seriously,” but all should “be
treated skeptically.”3 In a similar vein, Gray concludes his study with a list of findings that defense
planners may find accurate, but not particularly novel.4
The time is ripe for further reflection on this important and enduring problem as the United
States enters another season of issuing formal strategic plans, including a new National Security
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Nuclear Posture Review, among others. The Army
recently published a new version of the foundational doctrine Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and
will continue developing its new ambitious planning framework for “Multi-Domain Battle.”5 How,
in the process of all this planning, does the most powerful military in history currently handle the
fundamental challenge of making strategic choices for the future in the face of deep uncertainty?
In theory, one of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most important tools for strategy
development under uncertainty is scenario planning. Distinct from operational planning, which
focuses on applying existing capabilities to today’s threats, scenario planning aims to explore a
wider range of possible challenges several years or even decades into the future.6 Using alternative
future scenarios to test prospective capabilities, concepts, and policies—through wargaming,
modeling, and other analytic techniques—is a unique and necessary method for grappling with
uncertainty.
Since 2002, the DoD has employed a formalized joint process for scenario planning known
originally as the Analytic Agenda, subsequently renamed Support for Strategic Analysis (SSA).
Its codified purpose is to “support deliberations by DoD senior leadership on strategy and planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBES) matters, including force sizing, shaping and
capability development.”7 However, despite its intended importance to the DoD planning
processes, the SSA enterprise is actually far less influential than it could be on senior leaders’
decision-making. You will search many hundreds of pages in vain for any reference to the SSA
process in the memoirs of Defense Secretaries Rumsfeld, Gates, and Panetta.8 The process has

struggled to gain traction in recent major strategic reviews in the Pentagon. In addition, discussion
of SSA in professional literature is almost entirely confined to the defense analytic community.
Policy and strategy debates, by contrast, frequently include general discussions of scenarios, but
almost never address how military leaders and organizations should or do apply scenarios in their
decision-making.
The limits of classification have some bearing on SSA’s low public profile, but the more
important explanation is simply that scenario planning in the DoD has not fulfilled its promise as
a fulcrum for strategic planning. As veteran analyst Paul Davis put it in his 2016 report to Congress
on the status of joint scenario analysis, “defense secretaries, Joint Staff chairs, and service chiefs
are fully aware that they are planning under deep uncertainty. They have not been well served by
analysis that suppresses uncertainty.”9
Why is this so hard? Some of the answers are partly submerged in the arcane details of
bureaucratic processes and incentives, but the obstacles have strategic ramifications. Six
nettlesome challenges in particular have complicated the execution of effective scenario planning
in the Pentagon over the years. They can be summarized as dilemmas between competing priorities
or concepts.
1. Likelihood vs. plausibility as appropriate planning factors.
How likely does a scenario need to be to compel planning? Furthermore, how likely is any
given scenario in the first place? Despite the use of many scientific-sounding arguments
on the subject, and despite superficial deference to the intelligence community as an
authority on the subject of likelihood and plausibility, the answers to these questions are
entirely subjective and unverifiable. Everyone has an opinion, and very few can be
disproved. This means that a nearly endless number of uncertainties can be cause for
legitimate debate in making scenario assumptions, from the large (would we really deploy
combat forces to that continent?) to the small (would that ally give us that percentage of
ramp space at that commercial airport?). This is a very problematic feature of a process
dependent on extensive collaboration and consensus-based resolution of major issues.
2. High-resolution analysis of a small number of cases vs. low-resolution
analysis of a large number of cases.
Clearly, the uncertainty of the future security environment demands examination of a range
of scenarios for force planning. On the other hand, understanding (much less predicting)
combat outcomes is a complex endeavor, requiring specification of many factors. Tradeoffs are required between depth and breadth, but consensus on the proper balance here is
always fragile and unstable. Moreover, it is worth noting that the analytic and bureaucratic
cultures of DoD organizations tend to favor depth over breadth.
3. Long, structured timelines for data development and analysis vs. the need to
be responsive to senior leader guidance.
The more complex scenarios and associated data become, the longer it takes for the system
to produce and approve those products. This is a challenge regardless of which end of the
spectrum (identified in the previous point) the system tends toward (i.e., many simple

scenarios or few complex scenarios). A small number of highly detailed scenario products
generates significant workload and requires long and structured timelines for
development—but so do a large number of less-detailed scenario products. This presents a
challenge in making the scenario products responsive to senior leader input. Such input
inevitably disrupts timelines for data development and analysis, compromising the
timeliness of SSA products.
4. Transparent and collaborative process vs. innovative exploration of new
concepts and capabilities.
It is no secret that bureaucratic processes are enemies of innovation. The natural dynamics
and politics of developing collaborative products across multiple organizations with
differing incentives tend to produce compromises that elude difficult choices rather than
confront them, and suppress experimental ideas rather than nurture them. SSA products
often bear the mark of such compromises and tend to hew closely to conventional,
established thinking about strategic and operational approaches to scenarios. Yet there is
not a simple solution to this problem. SSA products are bound by the need to foster a
transparent collaborative process, both because the issues addressed require the expertise
of a diverse range of organizations, and because the viability of their ostensible role in
shaping programs and budgets depends on a certain degree of institutional credibility that
is conferred by the transparent, collaborative process.
5. Appropriateness of operational plans vs. scenarios as the basis for force
planning and “requirements” generation.
In theory, force planning, development, and investment should support near-term needs
from deliberate planning and those derived from potential future contingencies in an
integrated fashion. In fact, because operational planning and force planning processes are
so segregated in the DoD, operational plans and future scenarios end up competing with,
rather than complementing, each other when it comes to strategic resource allocation.10
Clearly, having force planning either solely focused on current plans or unrelated to current
plans would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the DoD has always struggled to strike a
deliberate balance in this regard.
6. Prerogatives of civilian planning guidance vs. military operational art.
Finally, the SSA process experiences a constant struggle, as do many Pentagon processes,
in defining a boundary between those prerogatives and judgments that civilian guidance
predominates and those that military operational expertise predominates.
The point of enumerating these debates or dilemmas is not to criticize any particular position
an organization might take on the substance of the issues. Rather, it is to paint as clear a picture as
possible of the fundamental structural impediments to designing an effective scenario-planning
process to support force development. Any such process will need to grapple with these dilemmas,
and will have to make trade-offs, whether deliberate or accidental, among worthy but competing
goals.

When the current round of official strategizing has culminated, senior officials, congressional
overseers, and defense professionals would do well to take stock of how well the process was or
was not served by scenario analysis, and grasp the opportunity to revitalize this essential tool for
strategic planning.
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